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Annual Meeting 
 
lease mark your calendars for the 2010 Annual 
Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich So-
ciety. The meeting will be held on Friday, October 
29, and Saturday, October 30, 2010 in Atlanta, 
Georgia. The American Academy of Religion and 
the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Cul-
ture Group” meets October 30 to November 2.  
 The annual banquet of the NAPTS will take 
place on Friday, October 29, at Pittypat’s Porch Res-
taurant, 25 Andrew Young International Boulevard. 
404.525.8228. The restaurant is located on Andrew 
Young International Blvd. between Peachtree Street 
and Spring Street, within easy walking distance from 
the convention hotels. It is also a block from the 
Peachtree Center Station of MARTA, the Atlanta 
subway line. 
 The distinguished speaker this year will be A. 
Durwood Foster. More information and reservations 
will be available in the fall issue of the Bulletin. 
 For registration, please contact the AAR web-
site: 
http://www.aarweb.org/Meetings/An-
nual_Meeting/Current_Meeting/default.asp 
 Housing information is available after register-
ing for the meeting. 
 
Letters to the Editor 
 
Dear Fred, 
 Thanks so much again for the current bulletin. 
The mellow reminiscences of Ray Bulman are par-
ticularly enjoyable. Your service in editing our organ 
of mutuality continues, I am sure, to be greatly ap-
preciated by the readership. May I voice additionally 
a concern triggered by Carl-Eric Gentes’s valuable 
comparison of Tillich and Michel de Certeau. I had 
just been reading Martin Leiner’s chapter (“Tillich 
on God”) in the noteworthy Cambridge Companion 
to Tillich edited last year by Russell Manning.       
  
 
P 
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 Both Leiner and Gentes assert unqualifiedly that 
Tillich holds the only non-symbolic statement we 
can make about God is that God is being-itself (Cf. 
Leiner, op. cit., p. 50). They both are apparently 
oblivious to the argument in ST II that the only such 
statement is “everything we say about God is sym-
bolic” (ST II, 9). After stressing this very deliber-
ately, Tillich goes on to say explicitly (p. 10) that 
being-itself is not a completely non-symbolic state-
ment about God. I have the impression a rather grave 
misrepresentation of Paulus may have been 
spawned—I run into it frequently in the oral tradi-
tion—and it needs rigorous correcting. 
  Most of us know of Tillich’s encounter in the 
1930s with W. M. Urban, from whom our mentor 
accepted the critique that his tendency to represent 
all God-talk as symbolic crucially lacked a linchpin 
with the universal human quest for truth. After the 
exchange with Urban, Tillich settled upon being-
itself as offering the requisite conceptual link. He 
held to this, under fire from John Herman Randall, 
Jr. and others, for a long time. But then, mirabile 
dictu, in 1957, in the “new introduction” he crafted 
for the second volume of his magnum opus, Paulus 
came forth with what I have cited above. To be sure, 
it was controversial, especially to those who could 
not imagine Paulus ever changing his mind about 
structural pilings of the system. But Tillich did 
sometimes change his mind, and this matter of the 
sole non-symbolic utterance was very important to 
him. I feel strongly we need to protect here the pu-
rity of the master’s voice. 
 Durwood Foster 
 Ashland, Oregon 
Tillich’s “God above God” after 
Mark Taylor’s After God 
David Nikkel 
 In his book After God, Mark C. Taylor has con-
tinued to move beyond his deconstructive phase with 
a creative theological and metaphysical effort center-
ing on complex systems. While judging that tradi-
tional concepts of God no longer speak to our age, 
Taylor does find a central place for divinity or the 
divine in our complex world. While greatly appreci-
ating Taylor’s contribution, I believe that a more 
traditional understanding of God or the divine is 
quite compatible with the emerging picture of our 
universe as constituted by the interactions of dy-
namic, complex systems. 
 Therefore, I propose to attempt the following in 
this article: I will reference Mark C. Taylor’s typol-
ogy of religion in relation to Paul Tillich’s theology. 
Taylor, who draws upon Tillich to develop two polar 
opposite types of religion, ends up classifying Til-
lich as one of those two, namely, as a monist. While 
granting that Tillich at some points does adopt posi-
tions consistent with monism, I will argue that over-
all he falls into another category. That category 
would be Taylor’s tertium quid, his favored type of 
religion, namely, that of complexity. I will claim that 
panentheism, with which Tillich is rightly identified 
but which Taylor ignores, represents an ideal model 
for complexity. Furthermore, I will argue that Tay-
lor, in his dialectical model of complexity, wrongly 
favors the “de-stabilizing” element over the “struc-
turing” element, or in Tillich’s terminology, the 
element of dynamics over that of form. By contrast, 
Tillich finds a better mix, as he gives the element of 
structure or form its proper due.  
 As suggested just above, Taylor offers an inter-
esting three-pronged typology of religions, referenc-
ing a Tillichian typology from “Two Types of Phi-
losophy of Religion.” These two types proffer con-
trasting schemas of the divine in relation to human-
kind and the world. The “cosmological” type pic-
tures God as a being distinct and separate from the 
world, known only through God’s effects on the 
world. Tillich would agree with Taylor that this 
model is dualistic, or at least tends towards dualism. 
On the other hand, the “ontological” type posits 
some identity or unity between humans and the di-
vine, despite estrangement, and some human aware-
ness of this identity, though not necessarily or even 
usually a self-conscious awareness capable of ver-
balization. Associating this ontological approach 
with the “monistic type of religion,” Taylor judges 
that Tillich’s own theology falls under such a type 
(2007:35-37). This monistic scheme includes a pri-
mordial unity whereby difference is unreal, the un-
folding of time is pre-programmed, and redemption 
is already actual (2007:37-39). 
 Prior to implicating Tillich, Taylor invokes from 
The Varieties of Religious Experience William 
James’ typology of the “once-born,” healthy-minded 
religious individual, versus the “sick soul,” who 
hopefully overcomes this sickness by becoming 
“twice-born” (2007:33-34). Taylor in general asso-
ciates the once-born with the monistic type of relig-
ion and the sick soul with the dualistic (2007:37). I 
will mark that I believe Taylor here misses the nu-
anced complexity of a very fecund thinker, even as 
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he will with Tillich. To be sure, Taylor can claim 
support for his interpretation in that James describes 
healthy-minded religion as entailing a sense of “un-
ion with the divine” (2007:33; James, 1902:79) and 
then cites Romantic-influenced thought emphasizing 
such union—liberal Protestantism, Emersonian tran-
scendentalism, and Walt Whitman (2007:34; James, 
1902:81-91). Taylor could also have cited—though 
he does not—the movement that occupies the bulk 
of James’ chapter on healthy-mindedness—the 
“mind-cure” or positive thought movement 
(1902:94-126), insofar as mind-cure’s notion of our 
kinship with divine Spirit represents a “decidedly 
pantheistic” element (1902:100-101). However, 
James’ assertion that all religion involves belief in 
the affinity, “continuity,” or “coterminousness” of 
our better human natures with the divine complicates 
things (1902:508). Further complications arise from 
James’ contrast of philosophical theism, which tends 
towards pantheism and monism, with popular the-
ism, which is “pluralistic”—and from James’ place-
ment of healthy-minded religion on the “pluralistic” 
rather than monistic side (1902:131-135). James in-
dicates that healthy-mindedness does not brook the 
notion of evil as finally rational, to be justified and 
preserved, but rather minimizes it as something to 
negate, to defeat (1902:132-133). For James, the 
practical impulse to ignore, conquer, or overcome 
evil constitutes a key component of (most) healthy-
minded religion; mind-cure in particular accom-
plishes this through the power of positive thinking 
(1902:88ff). Monism, by contrast, James avers, 
“maximize(es) evil,” “based on the persuasion that 
the evil aspects of our life are of its very essence” 
(1902:130-131). James then elaborates upon the sick 
soul in terms of psychological and existential grap-
pling with the evils of life (1902:134-162). This 
suggests to me that James’ distinction between 
healthy-minded and sick souls hinges upon the ex-
tent and depth of perceived evil in the world; it does 
not map neatly onto the categories of monism and 
dualism and their opposing models of the divine in 
relation to the world.  
 Indeed, dualistic religion in Taylor’s sense of a 
“transcendent” and (largely) “absent” God coupled 
with an essentially evil world barely makes an ap-
pearance in Varieties.1 Instead the God of popular 
religion provides the foil for the monistic God, 
whom James regards as ultimately causing, and be-
ing responsible for, all that transpires in the uni-
verse. Yet this “popular” or “practical” God is quite 
immanent in its own way. This God, the “supreme” 
(1902:131) but not sole power, takes particular ac-
tions that make a positive difference in the world 
(1902:520-524). Though James refers to his own 
understanding of God as “crass” or “piecemeal su-
pernaturalism” (1902:520), he actually rejects the 
notion that the divine acts on or from a truly super-
natural plane. Rather James invokes the subliminal 
or subconscious as the site where the divine impacts 
our world, as he essays to render divine causality 
and providence consonant with modern science 
(1902:523-524). 
 Moreover, James blurs the distinction between 
pluralistic, popular religion and monism by allowing 
a strong “pantheistic” element in popular theism. In 
Varieties, James judges that the world “may be so 
complex as to consist of many interpenetrating 
spheres of reality” (1902:122), may consist of a 
“collection” of realities “of different degrees of in-
clusiveness” (1902:525). A Pluralistic Universe ad-
mits of organic envelopment or encompassment of 
realities by ever more-inclusive realities. Indeed, 
“God…may conceivably have almost nothing out-
side of himself” (1909:125, emphasis James’; see 
also 312). Yet James insists that something must 
remain external to God—if only “metaphysical ne-
cessity” (1909:294), lest God be responsible for evil 
(1909:124, 310-311). In fact, James evinces his 
preference for such an inclusive God—thus not al-
lowing his “pluralism” to get out of hand 
(1909:152ff, 292-295). The monism James could not 
brook was a “thoroughgoing” one (1909:110) that 
made evil essential, necessary, rational—a view of 
evil James finds paradoxical and irrational 
(1902:131-132, 1909:294, 310-312). Finally, James 
claims that among thoughtful religious believers, a 
transcendent, “external” God, who designs the world 
from outside à la the traditional teleological argu-
ment, is not even a live option (1902:73-74, 
1909:24-30). Here we see a parallel between James 
and Tillich’s take on how a separated God, à la the 
ontological approach (which for Tillich includes 
teleological arguments), once dominated Western 
theology. That James ultimately opts for a model of 
God neither dualistic nor monistic suggests that Tay-
lor’s tertium quid of complexity may have found 
some expression in previous thinkers—including, as 
we shall see, Tillich.  
 I do grant that some partial aspects of Tillich’s 
understanding of God, humanity, the world, and 
their interrelationships meet some of Taylor’s mo-
nistic criteria. Yet I will argue that Taylor’s catego-
rization of Tillich’s theology misses the complexity 
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of Tillich’s views on the divine-world interrelation-
ship. Again, for Taylor monism entails a primordial 
unity whereby difference is unreal, the unfolding of 
time is pre-programmed, and redemption is already 
actual.  
 Tillich’s ontological elements—of individualiza-
tion and participation, dynamics and form, freedom 
and destiny—are premised on a distinction (as well 
as correlation) between self and world/other and on 
temporal change of the self in relation to its world. 
Taylor correctly notes that Tillich posits an (element 
of) identity of the human person with the divine that 
transcends the subject-object distinction—Tillich 
sometimes referred to this as “the mystical a priori.” 
For Tillich an inalienable participation of the human 
in the divine does obtain despite human alienation 
from God. Granted, even this element of identity is 
problematic on postmodern grounds. However, what 
Taylor misses is that this identity never constitutes 
the whole of a person’s experience—the experience 
of self in correlation with the world always remains 
for Tillich, even in the “purest” possible mystical 
experience. For Tillich then there is no undifferenti-
ated mystical experience. Even meditative mystical 
states involve particular mediating traditions and 
ways of being in the world; thus “the world,” the 
object side of things, is not left wholly behind, but 
becomes the vehicle or occasion for mystical aware-
ness (1959:28). Indeed, Tillich criticizes the extreme 
mystic, who ventures to reach pure, abysmal divin-
ity, for not “tak(ing) the concrete seriously” (1952a: 
186), “imply(ing) an ultimate negation of (human) 
existence in space and time” (1951:140; compare 
Systematic Theology II, 1957:69). Likewise, “the 
self,” the subject side, does not lose itself in pure 
divinity; individualization still pertains. The human 
being as a whole maintains some distinction from 
the divine; there is never identity without remainder.                                                                             
 Furthermore, when it comes to eschatology, Til-
lich is quite clear that participation in eternal fulfill-
ment or “redemption,” to use Taylor’s term, is 
hardly fully realizable or actual in this life—such 
fulfillment is ever fragmentary and provisional. For 
example, in summing up the section on “The Divine 
Spirit and the Ambiguities of Life” in Volume 3 of 
the Systematic Theology, Tillich pens the following: 
“In so far as it is created by the Spiritual Presence, 
the health of unambiguous life is reached; and al-
though unambiguous, it is not total but fragmentary, 
and it is open to relapse into the ambiguities of life 
in all its dimensions” (280). What of the Kingdom of 
God “above history,” where all the positive created 
in history is elevated to eternity and all the negative 
is exposed as negative (1963:396ff), in which there 
is “universal fulfillment” and participation 
(1963:406-409)? Is the individual, after he or she has 
died, lost in a dazzling light where all is white? Not 
according to Tillich. He affirms that “there is no par-
ticipation if there are no individual centers to par-
ticipate,” and “therefore the centered, self-conscious 
self cannot be excluded from Eternal Life.” Recog-
nizing the difficulty of speaking of that which tran-
scends time, he adds that “the self-conscious self is 
not what it is in temporal life” (1963:414). Tillich 
also issues the caveat, “Everything said which ex-
ceeds these two negative statements is not theologi-
cal conceptualization but poetic imagination” 
(1963:414). Though Tillich thus demurs from posi-
tive description of life beyond death, he clearly re-
jects the loss of individuality in an undifferentiated 
divine unity. 
 Focusing on the divine nature, Taylor on two 
points has more plausible grounds for accusing Til-
lich of monism: (1) time as the unfolding of a pre-set 
program, and (2) whether the otherness of the world 
is taken seriously—seriously enough for the world to 
make any difference to God. Much of Tillich’s cor-
pus, at least at first glance, seems quite ambiguous 
as to whether temporality, and whether the world in 
its otherness and difference, mean anything to God. 
To borrow Charles Hartshorne’s terminology, Til-
lich has a hard time letting go of the divine attributes 
from “classical theism” of immutabilility, impassi-
bility, and eternity as timelessness. Tillich was wont 
to write about God’s transcendence of the distinction 
between potentiality and actuality (1951:252, 254, 
271, 273; 1964:376), about dynamics/form and free-
dom/destiny always in perfect balance in the divine 
life (1951:181, 244-247; 1963:405), about the “not 
yet” in God always being balanced by an “already” 
(1951:236) (paradoxical language not unlike Tay-
lor’s during his deconstructive phase). What did Til-
lich mean by such language? While Tillich strives to 
be faithful to the Protestant Reformers in crediting 
our salvation all to God (1948:91, 1952b:175, 
1955:67, 80, Systematic, 1957:79), he consistently 
rejects determinism whenever he directly confronts 
the issue (1951:184, 186; 1954:41, 43, 47; 1955:30). 
Indeed, twice Tillich gainsays any divine plan in 
which all is predetermined (1948:106-107, 
1951:266). Moreover, his strongest assertion about 
newness in the divine life would seem to rule out 
foreknowledge of what humans will create, even as 
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Tillich wants to rule out any total surprise for God 
(see 1951:246-247 on the latter point):  
For the divine ground of being we must say both 
that the created is not new, for it is potentially 
rooted in the ground, and that it is new, for its 
actuality is based on freedom in unity with des-
tiny, and freedom is the precondition of all new-
ness in existence. The necessarily consequent is 
not new; it is merely transformation of the old 
(1963:398). 
 So Tillich apparently has granted some openness 
in the divine life to the freedom and spontaneity of 
the creation. However, when Tillich addresses the 
classical notion of impassibility, one may wonder 
whether creation in its freedom has any effect on 
God after all. Indeed, one may wonder whether the 
world means anything to God. To my awareness, 
Tillich directly writes of God’s suffering on only 
two occasions (1963:51), one of which professes 
agnosticism as to “what divine suffering may mean” 
(1964:379). In addition he qualified such suffering, 
according to Charles Hartshorne, apparently from 
conversations with Tillich: “God is suffering not in 
his infinity, but as ground of the finite” (1952:191). 
He more frequently refers to divine participation in 
creaturely suffering or in the negativities of crea-
turely existence. Even here, however, he feels some 
need for qualification. He labeled Albert Outler’s 
phrase that God “participates in the agony and trag-
edy of human life,” as not just symbolic—as are al-
most all statements about God for Tillich—but as 
“highly symbolic” (1964:379). Finally, Tillich spe-
cifically endorses “the fundamental theological doc-
trine of God’s impassibility” (1963:404) and the 
early church’s rejection of Patripassianism, that 
“God the Father” suffers (1951:270; 1963:404). 
 Is Tillich just engaging in blatant contradiction, 
or simply wallowing in paradox? I think not. While I 
cannot grant a final coherence to Tillich’s position 
on God’s relationship to what transpires in the 
world, I will claim that Tillich consistently held 
throughout his career a subtle, complex viewpoint. 
His position does assert that God’s going out from 
God’s self and returning to the divine self through 
creation of the world mean something to God, is of 
value for the divine life. While Tillich adopted this 
outlook from the time he became acquainted with 
Schelling’s work, it receives its clearest rendition in 
Volume III of his Systematic Theology:  
In this view the world process means something 
to God. He is not a separated self-sufficient en-
tity who, driven by a whim, creates what he 
wants and saves whom he wants. Rather, the 
eternal act of creation is driven by a love which 
finds fulfillment only through the other one who 
has the freedom to reject and to accept love 
(422).  
Apropos to this view, Tillich affirms that God takes 
a risk in creating the world and humankind 
(1954:55, 1964:378). But here is where we need to 
watch out for Tillich engaging in what my theologi-
cal mentor warned theologians are wont to do: tak-
ing away with the left hand what they have just 
given you with the right. Remember that all the posi-
tive of existence is lifted up into eternal life, while 
the negative is purged. Let me add that the positive 
is synthesized with a being’s essential nature (which 
includes positive essential potentialities we do not 
realize in time) (1963:400-401, 405-406). Indeed, 
even as he concedes, “that God may fail in what he 
intends to do through men and mankind,” Tillich 
concludes with “the transcending certainty that in 
spite of every individual and group failure, an ulti-
mate fulfillment can be expected” (1964:378). Til-
lich confirms that Eternal Life always entails a 
maximal fulfillment of world history: (1) “there is 
no ought-to-be in it which, at the same time, is not” 
(1963:402). (2) “There is no truth which is not also 
‘done,’ in the sense of the Fourth Gospel, and there 
is no aesthetic expression which is not also a reality” 
(1963:403). (3) “The only unconditional prospect is 
the promise and expectation of the supra-historical 
fulfillment of history, of the Kingdom of God, in 
which that which has not been decided in history 
will be decided and that which has not been fulfilled 
will be fulfilled” (1938:141). So the risk God takes 
is not as great as it might first appear: an ultimate 
insurance policy guarantees maximal divine bless-
edness. 
 How then should we characterize Tillich’s ren-
dering of God’s relationship to the world? For Til-
lich, creating the world is indispensable to divine 
fulfillment and blessedness. However, the particulars 
that happen or do not happen, the particulars we de-
cide or fail to decide, do not add to or subtract from 
that maximal divine blessedness. I do not claim that 
Tillich’s solution is tenable. Indeed, elsewhere I 
have argued its untenability. My purposes here relate 
to Taylor’s attachment of the monistic label to Til-
lich’s theology. Taylor does have some basis to so 
categorize Tillich. A certain pre-programmed un-
folding of history does apply. However, this applies 
to the value of history for divine fulfillment, not to 
historical particularities, which defy determinism 
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and do create the new. Taylor could also charge that 
Tillich at least blurs the distinction between divinity 
and the world, in that in eternal life an essentially 
perfect version of each one of us contributes to di-
vine blessedness. However, in our earthly lives we 
experience the reality of falling short of our essential 
being, as well as differences among individuals in 
the degree by which each falls short. Moreover, Til-
lich does indicate that the quality of an individual’s 
participation in eternal life bears some correlation to 
“the amount of fulfillment or non-fulfillment which 
goes into an individual’s essentialization” 
(1963:418), that is, it bears some correlation to what 
we actually do with our lives. 
 We first looked at the God-world relationship 
from the perspective of human experience, then pri-
marily from the divine side in terms of time, eter-
nity, and divine (im)passibility. But Tillich’s more 
basic and more “spatial” “doctrine of God” vis-à-vis 
the world also bears crucially upon the validity of 
Taylor’s monistic appellation. In his characterization 
of monism, Taylor rightly indicates that the real or 
divine is fully present and immanent—absence and 
transcendence finally do not apply. Moreover, dif-
ference is effaced by identity: despite their apparent 
differences, self, world, and the divine are one and 
the same (2007:37-38). Despite the obvious unipo-
larity implied in the very term, Taylor curiously 
identifies monism as a “both-and” schema (perhaps 
because the Real is both the world and the divine, 
which are nevertheless ultimately the same?). Using 
Taylor’s polar categories, I would avow that in a 
genuine “both-and” schema, the Real is both imma-
nent and transcendent, is both present and absent, 
and incorporates both identity and difference. Such a 
dipolar schema in fact fits well the profile of the 
model for the divine-world relationship known as 
panentheism.                                                                       
 In fact most Tillich scholars hold that Tillich is 
best understood as a panentheist, not as a monist/ 
pantheist. As suggested just above, panentheism at-
tempts to do justice to both divine immanence and 
transcendence, in contrast to the emphasis on the 
immanence of monism and the emphasis on the tran-
scendence of dualism, to use Taylor’s polar types. 
Growing out of German Romantic idealism, panen-
theism primarily reacted against what it perceived as 
an over-emphasis on transcendence, as a tendency 
towards dualism, in Western theology. Forms of 
pantheism, from German Romantic idealism and 
earlier, also countered that tendency. Thus, it should 
not surprise us that some have accused Tillich of 
pantheism or that, according to Nels Ferre, Tillich 
once confessed that the total “feel” of the presuppo-
sitions of Spinoza resonate with him more than those 
of any other thinker (127); nor that Charles Hart-
shorne, the foremost contemporary expositor of 
panentheism, originally called his model “the new 
pantheism.” As we shall see shortly, decisive differ-
ences exist between pantheism and panentheism. 
 Let me summarize the concept of panentheism 
before returning to Tillich as a panentheist. Literally 
meaning, “all is [in] God,” panentheism maintains 
that the world and its creatures constitute a part of 
God. To expand on that, panentheism holds that the 
world exists in God, included in the divine life, but 
that the reality of the individuals or the structures of 
the universe or of the universe as a whole do not ex-
haust the divine reality—and crucially that the real-
ity of these individuals entails an integral indetermi-
nate freedom and spontaneity. This means that all 
divine relations are internal relations, that is, rela-
tions between God as integrated whole and the crea-
tures as included parts. Yet these relations are com-
plex; contrary to the whole as undifferentiated, dis-
tinctions do pertain between including whole and 
included parts. Besides mutual freedom between the 
divine and the world, certain ontological properties 
of divinity, such as necessary existence and all-
encompassing attributes such as omnipresence and 
supreme power, apply to the including whole but not 
to the creaturely parts nor to the universe itself. 
Thus, a part of the divine is identical to the universe 
and its components, but difference remains.                                                             
 To return to Tillich, he significantly identifies 
the “mutual freedom” of God and world (Systematic 
Theology II, 1957:7) as what distinguishes his model 
from “pantheism” (Systematic, 1957:8, 1951:237), 
“emanationism,” or Spinoza’s mechanical necessity 
(1951:158). In the same vein, he cites finite freedom 
as separating his doctrine of God from Spinozistic 
monism, where the creatures are “mere ‘modes’ of 
the eternal substance” (1964:384). Several distinc-
tive Tillichian phrases highlight divine inclusiveness 
and immediacy: (1) God is not a being, but being-
itself. Rendered in manifold variations, this formula 
works against the dualistic, transcendental tenden-
cies of Western theism. Significantly Tillich identi-
fies the “God above God” with being itself and the 
power of being in everything. As such, this God is 
above the “God of theism” who is a being, identified 
with something concrete (1952:182, 186-190). (2) 
Divine participation in everything that exists. (3) 
God transcends the subject-object/self-world correla-
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tion insofar as this correlation also involves some 
separation—here “transcendence” means the imme-
diate presence of all reality to the divine. In connec-
tion with this motif, Tillich indicates that the God 
above God “is neither object nor subject” 
(1952:187). Note that no separation is not the same 
as without distinction—in which case, a world with 
its own integrity would not exist as present to a di-
vine reality. As Tillich frames it, “The acceptance of 
the God above the God of theism makes us a part of 
that which is not also a part but the ground of the 
whole” (1952:187).  Given Tillich’s insistence on 
creaturely freedom, his model of the divine as inclu-
sive of all reality is best understood as panentheistic 
rather than monistic. 
 This brings us to the third religious schema in 
Taylor’s typology, that of “complexity.” Complexity 
involves “identity-in-difference” and “difference-in-
identity,” “spontaneous self-organization,” and 
“emergent creativity.” Thus when it comes specifi-
cally to the “relation of identity and difference,” 
Taylor in fact does opt for “both-and” in his pre-
ferred model, as entities interconnect in complex 
ways (2007:38, 40). However, overall and officially 
Taylor characterizes his model of complexity as that 
of “neither-nor.” Self-organization serves as ultimate 
principle for Taylor. Indeed, for Taylor the physical 
laws of the universe themselves self-organizationally 
evolve (2007:322-323), while “Logos—whatever 
structures or principles pertain to self-organization—
is itself self-organized” (2007:346). Yet for Taylor, 
self-organized wholes do not constitute the “locus of 
the real” or divine. Such a locating of the real in self-
organized wholes would allow for a both-and with 
respect to transcendence/immanence and ab-
sence/presence à la panentheism, as each entity in-
cludes various parts, but only the divine as most real 
includes everything. Moreover, it would provide for 
a “both-and” relationship of identity and difference: 
Self-organized wholes have an integrity distinguish-
ing them from other wholes, while at the same time 
connections and similarities pertain among those 
wholes; parts of wholes contribute to, without being 
identical with, the whole that is more than the parts 
or their sum; and finally the world constitutes part of 
the identity of the God who also transcends it. Thus, 
I maintain that a “both-and” relationship best fits 
with complexity, rather than Taylor’s yoking of 
“neither-nor” and complexity.  
 Instead of self-organized wholes as loci of the 
real, Taylor identifies “the virtual” as “the elusive 
real in and through which everything that exists 
comes into being and passes away” (2007:40-41). 
As the elusive reality that allows for self-organized 
wholes, it is neither transcendent nor immanent, nei-
ther absent nor present (2007:38, 41). Taylor does 
posit a “both-and” dipolarity within complex sys-
tems of a structuring/stabilizing element versus a 
deconstructing/destabilizing element. However, he 
admits his favoritism for the destabilizing element 
(Columbia News). Indeed, it appears to be tanta-
mount to this elusive virtual. Finding some words 
for this elusive real, he likens it to “an immanent 
transcendence, which is inside as an outside that 
cannot be incorporated.” He further describes the 
virtual as “the source of the endless disruption that 
keeps complex systems open” (2007:41). Taylor as-
sociates the destructuring, undifferentiating element 
with the experience of the sublime, which he further 
associates with the experience of unlimited possibil-
ity (2007:119-124). Taylor has moved well beyond 
his deconstructive phase through his embrace of the 
importance of holistic meaning making. Neverthe-
less, his preference for the destabilizing element and 
for “neither-nor” over both presence and absence of 
the divine in the world probably reflects continuing 
Derridean deconstructive influence.  
  Indeed, I will make the case that Taylor re-
inscribes a type of dualism over-emphasizing tran-
scendence. Deconstruction, while having its imma-
nentist tendencies (insofar as we are trapped in our 
representations), also manifests interesting tenden-
cies towards transcendence: (1) difference, the un-
presentable, which transcends, which refuses capture 
by, any form or structure; (2) the later Derrida’s 
messianic ideal.2 This messianism—endorsed and 
expounded upon by John Caputo—constitutes a 
messianism “without content and without identifi-
able messiah” (28). While Derrida grants that this 
messianic ideal perforce comes from the particulari-
ties of tradition(s), it is intentionally a formal con-
cept, a wholly other that challenges in the name of 
justice the privileged claims of any and all historical 
social structures or meaning. One could regard this 
as a post-structuralist version of divine transcen-
dence. In any case Taylor does identify the virtual 
with the divine, the virtual that refuses capture in 
any form—that indeed works to de-form all forms. 
Taylor associates dualistic religion with “either-or”: 
things exist either in the inferior or evil realm or in 
the divine, perfect realm. Yet for the human who for 
now is stuck in the lower realm, “neither-nor” per-
tains: one can identify oneself as neither fully within 
this world nor fully within the world to come. One 
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cannot and should feel at home in this world. Simi-
larly for Taylor, one cannot wholeheartedly identify 
oneself with the meaningful forms of one’s life in 
this world, because that is not the locus of the most 
real. Yet the elusive virtual, the most real, is not any-
thing we can grasp nor is it any place in which we 
can make our home. 
 In an obvious sense this transcendent divine ever 
eludes us. Yet in another sense, it entails an immedi-
acy and an absolutism with respect to our connection 
with the divine. Clearly we do not incorporate the 
divine as structured particularity in Taylor’s schema 
(nor with Tillich’s mystical a prior). Nevertheless, 
insofar as we imaginatively participate in the un-
figurable sublimity of the virtual, we may ironically 
still end up with a “having of the divine” more in 
keeping with the absolutistic modern spirit than with 
the postmodern spirit. Here Taylor may well be 
closer to Tillich than he realizes, by maintaining 
some identity of the human with the divine.  
 In terms of the Tillichian ontological elements, 
Taylor over-emphasizes the element of dynamics 
over form. Contrary to Taylor and in the spirit of 
Tillich, I will now argue for a certain priority of 
form over dynamics in complex, dynamic systems. 
Let me begin with a fairly long quotation from Til-
lich:  
But dynamics is held in a polar interdependence 
with form. Self-creation of life is always of 
form. Nothing that grows is without form. The 
form makes a thing what it is, and the form 
makes a creation of man’s culture into what it is: 
a poem or a building or a law, and so on. How-
ever, a continuous series of forms alone is not 
growth. Another element, coming from the pole 
of dynamics, makes itself felt. Every new form 
is made possible only by breaking through the 
limits of an old form. In other words, there is a 
moment of “chaos” between the old and the new 
form, a moment of no-longer-form and not-yet-
form. This chaos is never absolute; it cannot be 
absolute because, according to the structure of 
the ontological polarities, being implies form. 
Even relative chaos has a relative form. But rela-
tive chaos with relative form is transitional, and 
as such it is a danger to the self-creative function 
of life. At this crisis life may fall back to its 
starting point and resist creation, or it may de-
stroy itself in the attempt to reach a new form 
(1963:50-51). 
Clearly Tillich envisions an interdependent relation-
ship where dynamics is indispensable. Yet in re-
marking that “being implies form” and that chaos 
itself always involves some form, I see a certain pri-
ority of form vis-à-vis dynamics. By contrast, Taylor 
regards the destabilizing element and the virtual as 
transcending all form.  
Let us apply this first to natural complex, dy-
namic systems. When a physical or biological 
system far from equilibrium self-organizes into a 
more complex system, the basic form of that 
system then normally needs to be maintained—
or, at least in the case of individual organisms, 
death ensues. Of course, the homeostasis of hu-
mans and other biological organisms represents 
a dynamic equilibrium. Bridging nature and cul-
ture, Tillich wrote of the need for humans to 
preserve their form, in terms of the “biological 
structure” that make us human, that allows for 
“intentionality and historicity” (1951:181-182).  
 At the same time, the element of dynamics en-
ables humans to transcend the “non-human” “bio-
logical realm” through technological and cultural 
creativity, through which they create the genuinely 
new (1951:181-182). Let me add a word about the 
stability and instability of biological species over 
time. While most species over the long haul do be-
come extinct or evolve into other species, stasis has 
occurred in many ancient species extant today. 
Moreover, the phenomena of “punctuated equilib-
rium” means that periods of disequilibrium, where a 
large proportion of species die or speciate into new 
ones, are the exception rather than the rule for the 
span of biological time. 
 What about natural “laws” or structures? The 
character of basic forces of the universe and their 
potential interactions may well have been up for 
grabs in the first fractions of a second of the Big 
Bang. However, my sense of the scientific consensus 
is that at least most of the basic structures that allow 
for various types of self-organization have remained 
stable for the past 13.7 billion years. What about the 
divine? While both Tillich and Taylor value the 
abysmal element of the divine, from which finite 
actualities arise and pass away, key differences 
emerge. With Tillich, God as reservoir of possibility 
goes out of the divine self and, we might say, self-
organizes certain possibilities in accordance with 
basic structures for the universe—structures that al-
low for dynamic self-organization. For Taylor by 
contrast, as suggested above, it is “self-organization 
all the way down,” so to speak. The abyss is “no-
thing” but “not nothing,” for “it is the anticipatory 
wake of the unfigurable that disfigures every figure,” 
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which is “the condition of the possibility of creative 
emergence”—again manifesting his preference for 
the destabilizing pole. The structures relevant to 
self-organization themselves arise out of “an-archy” 
(2007:164). Favorably referring to Hegel, Taylor 
pens that “(j)ust as God creates freely ex nihilo, so 
the productive imagination creates freely out of 
nothing” (2007:117).  
 In contradistinction to Taylor as I have inter-
preted him, I maintain that we and our world in no 
sense have experiential contact with that aspect of 
divinity that serves as the reservoir of all possibility, 
of that which is prior to embodiment. All the activity 
and creativity of emergent complex realities happen 
within structures, structures that are open, but never 
infinitely so. Here Tillich’s God above God has an 
important word to say: While we may find a kind of 
meaning in the God above all particularities, pre-
cisely when all particular structures have lost their 
meaningfulness, this meaning is “not a place where 
one can live” (1952a:189), but rather points to the 
“potential restitution” of particular meanings 
(1952a:186), as the divine source becomes partially 
present and immanent. 
 Taylor offers much of value on how today’s 
competing religious systems have lost coherence—
and about how their disorder provides opportunity 
for the creative emergence of new, more complex 
forms of religion. Noteworthy here, I sense some 
connection between Tillich’s kairos moment and 
Taylor’s moment of “self-criticality.” Yet, according 
to Tillich as I read him, more due must be given to 
form than Taylor admits. Even where older forms of 
religious traditions meet mostly rejection or die, new 
forms still radically depend upon the old. Selected 
components of the old are not added linearly, which 
as Tillich noted would be “merely transformation of 
the old” (1963:398) or “a continuous series of 
forms” (1963:50); rather a new complex whole ex-
ceeds any sum of its parts. Yet the old traditions 
form crucial components, they constitute “relative 
form” (1963:51)—without these, as well as that 
which partially disfigures and rejects the old, the 
new would be impossible. 
 To conclude, I have argued in this article that 
Tillich’s understanding of the God-world relation-
ship—when lingering attachments to impassibility 
and timelessness are jettisoned—cohere rather nicely 
with what we are learning about our universe as con-
stituted by interactions among self-organizing, com-
plex wholes. Indeed, I have argued that Tillich, inso-
far as he can account for structures that enable self-
organized complexity, offers a more complex under-
standing of the divine-world relationship than Tay-
lor’s. When it comes to complex interconnections, 
Tillich panentheistically allows for both identity and 
difference of God and the world in “both-and” fash-
ion, while for Taylor the relationship of divinity to 
the world is as an otherness within. The divine fi-
nally appears to have little to no connection to forms 
or structures within the world, but rather has its con-
nection with infinite disruption and restlessness 
(2007:345, 358). Consistent with his special associa-
tion of de-stabilization and restlessness with the di-
vine, Taylor valorizes unending restlessness as the 
highest good for humans (2007:38, 41, 345). While 
Taylor does affirm the importance of form/structure 
making, his preference for defiguring means that 
there are no forms or structures in or through which 
we can feel at home. Tillich recognizes that dynam-
ics and form exist in interdependent correlation, in-
deed normally in some kind of balance (1951:181)—
though given human estrangement from its ground 
of being, some imbalance inevitably occurs. I would 
reiterate that the homeostasis of humans and other 
biological organisms represents a dynamic equilib-
rium, as well as note that our embodied lives are 
thoroughly temporal and that newness and creativity 
constitute a key value in our orientation, knowing, 
and action with respect to our natural and social 
worlds. And I will grant Taylor that his vaunted 
“disequilibrium” (2007:345) is sometimes both un-
avoidable and quite productive. Yet I claim that we 
can navigate through the ever-changing flow of life 
with a deep sense of at-home-ness, of groundedness, 
through our bodily being in the world, avoiding both 
complacency as well as consignment to Taylor’s 
unending “dissatisfaction” and “restlessness” (Tay-
lor, 2007:345). 
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Tillich’s Ethical Nature as Drawn 
from Nietzsche and Luther 
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Good Christians Friends, rejoice, With heart and 
soul and voice; 
Now ye hear of endless bliss; Jesus Christ was 
born for this! 
He has opened heaven’s door, And we are blest 
forevermore. 
Christ was born for this! Christ was born for 
this!1 
 
Introduction 
 
When the Christmas season approaches, the car-
ols of Christmas are in the air. The Medieval Latin 
carol, “Good Christian Friends, Rejoice,” provides a 
glimpse into the concept of kairos moment born out 
of love giving hope in a time that seems so troubled. 
We live in a world that at times seems to be disinte-
grating with economic crisis, war, global warming, 
and a noticeable lack of family values. Into this time, 
the question of morality comes into the limelight in 
politics, the churches, and on the street. With so 
much political rhetoric around family values and 
various ideas of morals and morality, one must ask 
what we can learn as people of faith and as individu-
als from those who have struggled with these issues 
before us.   
Morality defines the laws of nations, religions, 
and life. The issue of morality, its definition, and 
how its laws are used come to light in the writings of 
many philosophers and theologians. Surprisingly, 
the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who started as a 
Christian from the Lutheran tradition and ended up 
turning his back on God through atheism, and Paul 
Tillich, a great twentieth century theologian, inter-
sect with their thoughts on morality. Paul Tillich 
found a way of talking about morality that moves 
beyond Nietzsche’s good and evil (morality) and 
into a time (kairos) where agape love rules.   
Although it confused me at times as to who was 
saying what, I was drawn to this topic while simul-
taneously reading Nietzsche and Tillich. This 
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thought provoking confusion led me to the realiza-
tion that a theologian could use and change a self-
proclaiming atheist philosopher’s perspective to re-
claim life and the importance of religion. In this pa-
per I will first look at Nietzsche’s concepts of good, 
bad, evil, and morality, followed by Tillich’s defini-
tions of moralism, moralisms, morality, and the 
moral imperative. After exploring the meaning of 
morality and the moral imperative, I will delve into 
one place where both Nietzsche and Tillich agree 
that love transcends morality. After exploring love, I 
will address the issue of time by paying close atten-
tion to Tillich’s use of the Greek kairos. In my re-
flections, I will interweave Martin Luther and Lu-
theran tradition, which show the connections be-
tween Luther’s writings and their influence on both 
Nietzsche and Tillich. I will argue that both Tillich 
and Nietzsche built on their Lutheran foundation to 
come to a point where Tillich reclaims morality from 
Nietzsche’s deconstruction through Tillich’s under-
standing of agape transcending kairos, creating a 
new being in a new moment. 
 
Nietzsche on Morality 
 
When entering Nietzsche’s critique on morality, 
one must understand not only what he means but 
also how he transvalues or revalues the meaning of 
good, bad, evil, morals, and morality. In Human, 
All-Too Human, Nietzsche gives a prehistory of 
good and evil coming from “ruling tribes and 
castes.”2  Good and evil are about the supremacy and 
subjectivity in power relations. He writes, “The good 
are a caste, the bad a mass like dust. Good and bad 
are for a time the same as noble and low, master and 
slave.” This evil comes into play in the “other,” 
when the other is “considered hostile, ruthless, ex-
ploiting, cruel, cunning, whether they be noble or 
low.” Thus originally, good and bad are defined by 
the powerful where as evil comes out of the hostility 
that the subjugated feel against those that are.3 In On 
the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes: 
The source of the concept ‘good’ has been 
sought and established in the wrong place; the 
judgment ‘good’ did not originate with those to 
whom ‘goodness’ was shown! Rather it was the 
‘the good’ themselves that is to say the noble, 
powerful, high-stationed and high minded, who 
felt and established themselves and their actions 
as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradis-
tinction to all the low, low-minded, common and 
plebian. It was out of this pathos of distance that 
they first seized the right to create values and to 
coin names for values.4 
The powerful, supreme, and noble of birth de-
fine what good means and is; therefore, the other 
becomes bad. Once this judgment of values occurs, 
evil enters the picture as the lower classes judge the 
values of the powerful. The concept that the power-
ful are the ones who make the first definition should 
not come as a shock in today’s world, especially 
when one considers today’s society. One only needs 
to look to the rich and the powerful to hear what is 
good, bad, and evil even when they do not live up 
the conduct that they set before the people. The gov-
ernment, according to the words of the Preamble to 
the United States Constitution, to be “of the People, 
by the People and for the People,” seems to have 
forgotten the people who have become controlled by 
industry and the corporate world. 
For Nietzsche, the good equal the nobility while 
the bad equal the common people, who are not part 
of the ruling class.5 The nobility define good to be 
what is useful and are not conscious of the bad since 
they see no necessity for it. Thus the nobility have 
the ability to shrug off the misdeeds done to them, 
while the oppressed remember the misdeeds. Out of 
the oppressed comes the concept of evil since it 
originates out of the slave morality leading to res-
sentiment6 and hatred. Ressentiment is further fos-
tered by priestly members of the nobility who want 
to move closer to power. The priestly class, consid-
ered the lowest in the noble families, did not have 
the power to be the master. Rather than becoming 
slaves, they found another way to reduce the 
strength of the noble to raise up the weak. This in 
turn creates a slave revolt causing the transvaluation 
of values in which the good become bad and their 
actions become evil.7 Weakness is turned into 
strength. 
Within the lower class, resentment leads to evil.  
Evil enters the world when guilt and shame teach 
humanity to be ashamed. Nietzsche writes, “For it 
was with the aide of such inventions (gods and 
genii/idols) that life then knew how to work the trick 
which it has always known how to work, that of jus-
tifying itself, of justifying its ‘evil’.”8 Evil rises out 
of hiddenness that creates guilt and the need for re-
venge. It provides fertile ground for planting and 
growing resentment. Once the seeds of resentment 
have been planted they sprout quickly into judging 
the powerful as evil. Thus, evil becomes anything 
and everything that elevates one above and beyond 
the group (herd).9 
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The herd or group mentality is expressed 
through the Danish Jenta law where people strive to 
be average; no one wants to do better or worse than 
anyone else. If someone does his/her best and moves 
beyond the group, then s/he are thought to be brag-
ging. Even though this law no longer supposedly 
exists, people still strive to remain only average.10 
Another cultural example of this is the tradition in 
Japan that if a nail sticks out further than the others 
one must nail it back in. I experienced the nail con-
cept when one of my students wore the wrong uni-
form to school. Japanese students wear school uni-
forms, either a formal one or a sweat suit. If one stu-
dent forgot what to wear, the student was fairly well 
shamed into either calling a parent or borrowing 
from someone else so as not to stand out.   
Even in the United States, the idea that people 
should behave the same occurs. Take the workers in 
an assembly line, for example. If one person works 
too fast or does too much, the other workers clamp 
down on that person, saying that that person makes 
them look bad.11 The other workers want to appear 
to have equal value and are not happy when some-
one goes above the call of what the group deems as 
workable.  
Nietzsche’s critique was that people want to be 
the same and someone not fitting the criteria be-
comes the “other” or the “evil” one. This remains 
valid even in the Twenty-First Century. Reflecting 
back to On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche’s 
critique of Christianity is stated in Ecce Homo: “the 
birth of Christianity out of the spirit of ressentiment, 
not, as people believe, out of the ‘spirit’—a coun-
termovement by its very nature, the great rebellion 
against the dominion of noble values.”12 Christian 
morality, born out of resentment, gave perspective to 
going beyond good and evil and overcoming moral-
ity. 
Resentment as a creative power comes from de-
fining itself as different. It incubates and matures in 
the hostile world,13 often showing itself in the form 
of creating tension, discord, and eventually rebel-
lion. Slave morality causes rebellion since the lower 
class does not have the sophistication of the nobility 
to let go and forget the bad. The lower class sinks 
into evil where resentment gains complete creative 
power to turn towards revolt. This destroys the op-
portunity for communication between the slave and 
master until the only option of seizing power 
through force. The values that the nobility claimed 
as good have been transvalued by slave morality to 
become bad, and through this value designation of 
being outside the group to becoming evil. 
Once the values are put into place, Nietzsche de-
fines morality as the ranking of values that drive a 
human as the code of life and knowledge.14 Morality 
becomes the phenomenon in which life comes to be. 
Morality is the Ten Commandments of life; the law 
changes depending from which perspective morality 
is viewed. Nietzsche provides two basic views of 
morality, the master morality, and the slave (herd) 
morality.15 The master morality is the morality of the 
nobility, the powerful, in which the lower classes are 
not even viewed but used as the masters see fit. Al-
though the lower classes make up the herd or the 
slave, it is through the slave morality that values are 
trans-valued where the good of the nobility is seen 
as bad by the lower classes. The lower classes cause 
the transvaluation in their quest to gain power. Til-
lich understands this, taking Nietzsche’s perspective 
to another level. 
 
Tillich on Morality 
 
Tillich builds off of Nietzsche’s perspectives 
and revalues Nietzsche’s work to enter into a 
theonomous ethic. He does this using the terms: 
moralism, moralisms, morality, and the moral im-
perative. Tillich states, “‘Moralism’ designates an 
attitude toward life …the distortion of the moral im-
perative into an oppressive law.”16 Tillich goes on to 
say that this type of moralism is negative and has no 
plural form.  
If there is a plural form of moralism, then “mor-
alisms…points to systems of moral imperatives as 
they have developed in special cultures and are de-
pendent upon the relativities and limitations of these 
cultures.” He continues, “The distinction between 
moralisms as ethical systems and moralism as a 
negative attitude is identical with the distinction be-
tween the creative and the oppressed character of 
moral imperatives, and each ethical system has both 
characteristics.”17 For Tillich, moralisms equal the 
various types of morality that Nietzsche discusses.  
Tillich defines morality as “the experience of the 
moral imperative” essential to humans being hu-
mans.18 Morality also can equal moral behavior. 
Thus, if morality can equal human moral behavior, it 
is dependent upon culture, one of the basic functions 
that define Tillich’s concept of the human spirit.19 
The three basic functions of the human spirit are mo-
rality, culture, and religion. He states, “Morality is 
the constitution of the bearer of the spirit, the cen-
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tered person; culture points to the creativity of the 
spirit and also to the totality of its creations; and re-
ligion is the self-transcendence of the spirit toward 
what is ultimate and unconditioned in being and 
meaning.”20 Thus, the moral imperative provides the 
dynamic unity that gives vitality and “ultimate seri-
ousness both to culture and to religion.” 
If one truly wants to understand Tillich’s use of 
morality, one must explore Tillich’s use of the moral 
imperative. The moral imperative commands a per-
son to be “a person within a community of per-
sons.”21 Tillich defines a person to be a self-centered 
person. This relationship allows a person to belong 
to and yet also confront the world. The moral im-
perative directs the power of being; it is actualized in 
time and space.22 The goal of the moral imperative is 
to drive people into community and away from self-
realized disintegration. Thus Tillich argues, “For the 
ethical problem this means that the moral act is al-
ways a victory over disintegrating forces and that its 
aim is the actualization of (human) as a centered and 
therefore free person.”23 Nietzsche and Tillich both 
look for ways in which the human is freed. For 
Nietzsche, the concept of the übermensch (super-
man) is freedom from morality.24 The problem, 
however, remains that each level of morality is over-
come by another system of laws that comes into 
play. Thus, the übermensch, either as an individual 
or as a group of nobles, never reaches a point where 
morality no longer exists.25 For Tillich, freedom 
comes as people live in community where self-
centered people overcome the disintegrating forces 
through morality, culture, and religion that frees 
them.  
  
Tillich on the Moral Imperative in Dialogue with 
 Nietzsche  
 
The moral imperative, as defined by Tillich, 
“puts our essential being as a demand against us… 
In the moral imperative we ourselves, in our essen-
tial being, are put against ourselves…Morality is the 
self-affirmation of our essential being.”26 The moral 
imperative not only measures individuals, but also 
participation within the group. The moral impera-
tive, thus, actualizes humanity’s creative potential as 
it supports the person as a centered self in the com-
munity.27 Humans experience moral imperatives as 
law when they are estranged from the power of be-
ing; the moral imperative brings them back into the 
community as a centered person.28 Thus, if morality 
leads to self-affirmation of our being, then it leads us 
into community where ethics lead to the creative 
process of life together. 
Tillich answers the question of how religion and 
morality are related through stating: 
The relation of religion and morality is not an 
external one, but that the religious dimensions, 
source, and motivation are implicit in all moral-
ity, acknowledged or not. Morality does not de-
pend on any concrete religion; it is religious in 
its very essence. The unconditional character of 
the moral imperative, love as the ultimate source 
of the moral commands, and grace as the power 
of moral motivation, are the concepts through 
which the question of the relation of religions 
and morality is fundamentally answered.29  
With love as the ultimate source and grace as the 
ultimate power, Tillich believes that religion and 
morality are interrelated, illustrating that morality in 
its very nature is religious. Nietzsche shows that 
since morality is religious in its nature, morality 
must be overcome to a point of amorality.30  
In his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche decon-
structs morality, showing the path into being that 
morality has taken over time. He gives at least two 
genealogies and perspectives for the development of 
morals.31 One stems from an economic base. It 
moves from buying and selling (unpaid debts) to a 
master and slave situation. Once the master and 
slave relationships have formed, the veneration of 
ancestor worship begins. This creates a god or idol 
that is the precursor to the God of Abraham leading 
to the Christian God where Jesus is self-sacrificing. 
This self-sacrificing God leads to a Christian moral-
ity that is a morality of the weak.32  
Another genealogy is based on memory33 and 
conscience. It occurs when one looks at morality as 
beginning with memory and then moving to prom-
ise.34 Once the promise has been made, the chance 
that the promise may be broken enters into a cycle 
leading to guilt. A sense of guilt leads to a sense of 
duty and conscience. From the sense of duty and 
conscience, punishment35 and cruelty36 come into 
play. Once a promise has been broken and the con-
science realizes it, resentment enters the picture.   
Then it progresses into a festival mode, finally lead-
ing to the concepts of good conscience, bad con-
science, and ethics.37 These two genealogies join 
together in the sense that they both create concepts 
of guilt, concepts of what is good and bad, concepts 
of what is right and wrong, and the concept of what 
is the proper societal response and punishment for 
going against it.  
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 36, 2, Spring 2010 14 
Nietzsche’s genealogies of morals provide ways 
of looking into how cultures think. Often a culture’s 
concept of what is moral comes from its genealogi-
cal line. Since Nietzsche strongly critiques Christi-
anity, his conception of Christian morals, though at 
times valid, provides a negative view of what many 
consider to be “good” and “just” morals. The whole 
idea of Jesus dying on the cross, the self-sacrifice of 
one man who is God, negates the good for 
Nietzsche, since no one could truly live up to that 
example as humans never do anything out of com-
plete altruist love. 
Whereas Nietzsche deconstructs morals and mo-
rality, Tillich believes taking the morality risk as 
true morality is based on the “courage to be.”38 The 
risk is that in “the dynamic self-affirmation of man 
as man,” one “must take the threat of non-being, 
death, guilt, and meaninglessness into itself.”39 This 
illustrates moralisms in contrast to morality, as 
moralisms provide safety and morality entails the 
risk of non-being. Morality needs courage to face the 
existential question of looking into the abyss and 
perhaps facing estrangement and nonbeing. Grace 
provides the bridge to overcome guilt and 
estrangement, connecting the courage to be with the 
safety of moralisms.40 
Tillich recaptures the grace lost in Nietzsche’s 
deconstruction of good, bad, evil, morals, and moral-
ity, and brings morality back into a strong ethic of 
love for one’s neighbor.41 Since Tillich and 
Nietzsche were both raised as German Lutherans, 
they were influenced by their Lutheran heritage, up-
bringing, and similar circumstances within the Ger-
man church as well as having both served in wars.  
Tillich claims his Christian Lutheran heritage,42 
while Nietzsche rejects his.    
Although the academic world has often over-
looked the powerful connection of Tillich43 and 
Nietzsche44 with Luther and Lutheranism, the con-
nection exists. James Luther Adams writes of Til-
lich’s connection stating, “he was a Lutheran, a par-
ticular kind of Lutheran, and he brought to bear upon 
Luther’s mind and piety his own unique scholarly 
and theological perceptiveness… for him Luther’s 
ideas were often a point of departure, in the sense 
that he developed or expanded these ideas in new 
direction.”45 Let us look at one of these connections. 
 
Love Transcends Morality 
 
Love seems to connect Luther, Nietzsche, and 
Tillich, as through love it is possible for all three to 
go beyond the boundaries of morality. Although Lu-
ther sees love for one’s neighbor as what provides 
the grounds for morality, he also understand that 
love transcends morality as it is in living out the life 
of faith that God has given.46 Nietzsche writes, 
“Whatever is done from love always occurs beyond 
good and evil.”47 Let us compare Nietzsche’s quote 
with Tillich’s statement, “Love, realizing itself from 
kairos to kairos, creates an ethics that is beyond the 
alternatives of absolute and relative ethics.”48 In this 
comparison, love moves people from the realm of 
just doing good works to the realm of going beyond 
the laws of morality. According to Tillich, “Love, 
agape, offers a principle of ethics that maintains an 
eternal, unchangeable element, but makes its realiza-
tion dependent on continuous acts of a creative intui-
tion. Love is above the law.”49 This juxtaposition 
allows us a connective lens of Tillich, Nietzsche, and 
Luther.  
The question concerning love is what kind of 
love does each of the writers use as their understand-
ing of love. In his various writings, Luther often 
talks about love for one’s neighbor, philia, or the 
love of God, agape. Nietzsche, with his support of 
Dionysian aspects, would lean towards the lusty love 
of eros. For Tillich, agape love includes all the 
qualities of love—philia, eros, and epithymia (li-
bido).50 Agape is the love that transcends the moral 
imperative, which “transcends the finite possibilities 
of (humanity),” and that is the “highest work of the 
divine Spirit” going “beyond faith and hope.”51 The 
connection for Tillich between moralisms and love 
is that “moralisms of justice drive toward the moral-
ity of love. Love, in the sense of this statement, is 
not an emotion but a principle of life… Love…is the 
ground, the power, and the aim of justice.”52 
Tillich believes that love has more than just 
emotion since emotions cannot be commanded.53 He 
continues, “it may well be that the ethical nature of 
love is dependent on its ontological nature, and that 
the ontological nature of love gets its qualifications 
by its ethical character.”54 Tillich compares his ideas 
of love and power with that of Nietzsche when he 
states: 
Love and power are often contrasted in such a 
way that love is identified with a resignation of 
power and power with a denial of love. Power-
less love and loveless power are contrasted. 
This, of course, is unavoidable if love is under-
stood from its emotional side and power from its 
compulsory side. But such an understanding is 
error and confusion. It was this misinterpretation 
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which induced the philosopher of the ‘will-to-
power’ (i.e. Nietzsche) to reject radically the 
Christian idea of love. And it is the same misin-
terpretation which induces Christian theologians 
to reject Nietzsche’s philosophy of the ‘will-to-
power’ in the name of the Christian idea of love. 
In both cases an ontology of love is missing and 
in the second case power is identified with social 
compulsion.55  
When Nietzsche viewed “the will to power” as 
being the will of life, his issue with love was that it 
was self-sacrificing and denied power.56 As the will 
of life, power takes on a formative role where it can-
not be separated from life. Love denies power and 
therefore denies life. One of Nietzsche’s main cri-
tiques of the Christian church is that it denies power 
in self-sacrifice as exemplified in Christ’s dying on 
the cross.57 The weakness of the event is that Christ 
as God (a part of the Trinity) gave up his power and 
life in love for the world. The powerful thing to do 
would be to choose life; choosing death is weakness 
and thus love leads to weakness. Nietzsche needs 
love to be filled with passion flowing from the pow-
erful, the nobility.58  
Tillich argues that Nietzsche misunderstood the 
relationship between power and love. Since many 
scholars and theologians followed Nietzsche’s 
thought, Tillich identifies the problem that if “God 
as the power of being was discarded as a pagan inva-
sion,” then the Trinity would be dissolved.59 So love 
must surpass the ethical, the social, the moral, and 
the distrust and rejection of power overcome in the 
ontological question. Love must transcend ethics, 
morals, and power in order to unite the individual 
and the community in the process of the new being. 
Tillich describes love as being “the answer to the 
problem of moralisms and morality.”60 Love recon-
nects and reunites the individual with the ground of 
being and the individual with the community, thus 
changing the old being into new being. Love, the 
source of grace, “includes justice to others and to 
oneself.”61 This love that accepts the unacceptable 
and achieves transcendence must be the agape love. 
Tillich states “Agape is love cutting into love, just as 
revelation is reason cutting into reason and the Word 
of God is the Word cutting into all words.”62 Agape 
cuts into the earthly chorological (chronos) time 
through the heavenly kairos time.   
 
Kairos Arriving in Love 
 
Tillich contrasts classical Greek words of time 
where “the term kairos, the right time, fulfilled time, 
time in which something decisive happens, is not the 
same as chronos, chronological time, which is watch 
time, but it means the qualitative time in which 
‘something happens.’”63 To reach his concept of eth-
ics, Tillich shifts the focus from a linear chronologi-
cal approach to a primarily kairos one.  
An example of kairos comes from the Jesus 
event when the Apostle Paul described the atmos-
phere as being heavy and ripe for the coming of the 
Christos.64 The Christ event happens in a linear 
timeframe but also in a qualitative timeframe. As the 
medieval carol goes, “He has opened heaven’s door, 
And, we are blest forevermore. Christ is born for 
this!”65 The qualitative happens when the impossible 
is possible, when the time has come and the moment 
is right for the action or event to take place. God 
opens heaven’s door at the right moment of Christ’s 
birth entering into the world as God incarnate, the 
impossible becoming the possible, God becoming 
human. The event breaks into history. 
According to Tillich, kairos is not only a one 
time event but, “we all experience moments in our 
lives when we feel that now is the right time to do 
something, now we are mature enough, now we can 
make the decision.”66 That moment of knowing this 
is the time to do something is the qualitative moment 
of kairos. The Holy Spirit provides peace and the 
person realizes that God’s voice is something to be 
cherished and not ignored. God’s love breaks 
through the fear and into the moment. 
Since love adapts to every situation appearing in 
every kairos, “ethics in a changing world must be 
understood as ethics of the kairos.”67 The question of 
what Tillich means by kairos arises and he provides 
various explanations of kairos in his writings. In The 
Interpretation of History, Tillich describes how he 
came to use the New Testament’s concept of the ful-
fillment of time being kairos as a “border-concept 
between Lutheranism and Socialism,” illustrating 
“characteristic of German Religious Socialism.”68 
He states: 
The term is meant to express the fact that the 
struggle for a new social order cannot lead to a 
fulfillment such as is meant by the Kingdom of 
God, but that at a special time special tasks are 
demanded, and one special aspect of the King-
dom of God appears as a demand and expecta-
tion. The Kingdom of God will always remain as 
transcendent; but it appears as a judgment to a 
given form of society and as a norm to a coming 
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one. Thus, the decision for Socialism during a 
definite period may be the decision for the 
Kingdom of God, even though the Socialist ideal 
remains indefinitely distant from the Kingdom 
of God.69 
Tillich draws on the background of Lutheran 
mysticism to describe kairos as a creative power that 
can be possibly also be a destructive power when it 
goes towards the demonic. Kairos becomes a mo-
ment when an aspect of the Kingdom of God ap-
pears in a specific moment for a specific reason cre-
ating a new being or a new aspect in time. The kai-
ros moment often appears to be judgment as fulfill-
ing the law. Kairos as the fulfillment of time allows 
for creativity to break into history as it creates an 
ethic that goes beyond all types of ethics (i.e. abso-
lute and relative ethics).70 Kairos and love work to-
gether in the sense where love is eternal. Thus, love 
“creates something new in each kairos.”71 
Although each kairos is the fullness of time at 
the moment of an event, it must be seen in relation 
to the unconditioned.72 The unconditioned plays a 
role as it is occurring at the same time as the event as 
“knowledge born in the situation of the Kairos then 
is not knowledge growing out of accidental arbitrary 
events of a period but out of the period’s basic sig-
nificance.”73 Psychological and sociological proc-
esses make the appearance of the unconditioned pos-
sible; however, they do not validate it.74 The uncon-
ditioned is validated in its role of occurring in the 
kairos event.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The unconditional is transcended by love, as 
love is always capable of breaking in as a new kairos 
creating new laws and ethical systems.75 Love’s 
breaking in as kairos defeats Nietzsche’s über-
mensch from ever reaching an amoral state. Love as 
the creative and basic principle of life provides the 
grounds for creating a just ethic in which we find 
“the meaning of ethics: The expression of the ways 
in which love embodies itself, and life is maintained 
and saved.”76 Love as shown through God’s amazing 
act of selfless love breaking into the human world 
through the Christ event continues to express its 
salvific qualities through the kairos moments it cre-
ates. Tillich’s expression of kairos is built on his 
Lutheran heritage and on his reclaiming morality 
from the deconstruction of Nietzsche’s trans-
valuation of morals. This creates an ethic of faith 
active in love that transcends morality. 
Where Nietzsche planted the concept of resent-
ment, Tillich countered with love. Nietzsche viewed 
resentment as the root of evil, whereas Tillich 
viewed love, through kairos, conquering all else. 
Nietzsche believed that morality needed to be over-
come since it was caught up in the religious; religion 
was designed as a constraint to keep the human from 
being greater. Tillich believed that morality in its 
essence was intricately connected to religion and 
culture as they are all grounded in the Spirit.77 
Both Tillich and Nietzsche use perspectivism to 
expose the cultural aspects of morality, moralism, 
and morals. Tillich utilizes Nietzsche’s perspectiv-
ism to create an ethical system where the ground of 
being centers the individual to participate in a com-
munity that is grounded in faith. He transvalues 
Nietzsche’s concept of going beyond good and evil 
(morality) to love transcending kairos to create new 
cultural rules and norms. Tillich’s emphasis on 
agape love transcending morality as it breaks into 
chronological time through kairos moves the ethical 
system into a new moment of fulfillment where the 
faith given by the ground of being is active in the 
love for one’s neighbor.   
Through Tillich’s understanding of kairos and 
agape, hope remains for the world despite continu-
ing news reports of the “evil” of war, famine, natural 
disasters, and street violence. Grace through the jus-
tice of love provides a glimpse of the Kingdom of 
God in a kairos moment creating a new ethical sys-
tem. The effect of the kairos moment for a specific 
time and event in history continues to allow creative 
power and love to guide humanity towards a brighter 
future. The future may look bleak according to 
Nietzsche and the press, but Tillich spins God’s love 
and grace into a new being calling humanity back 
into relationship with the ground of being as the ul-
timate concern. Through the gift of the Christ event, 
we are pulled out of the grasp and power of chrono-
logical time, trusting through faith that kairos mo-
ments continue to shape our history as we live into 
the creative self-centered beings participating in the 
community of Christ. Thus we can rejoice and sing 
as the carol calls us. 
Good Christians Friends, rejoice, With heart and 
soul and voice; 
Now ye hear of endless bliss; Jesus Christ was born 
for this! 
He has opened heaven’s door, And we are blest for-
evermore. 
Christ was born for this! Christ was born for 
this!78 
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title. 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche.  On the Genealogy of Morals, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:  Vintage Books, 
1989) I 2. For the rest of the paper noted as GOM. 
5 This section comes from my reflection on Beyond 
Good and Evil and Genealogy of Morals (First Essay) as 
well as lecture notes from a CTS class on Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard taught by Laurel Schneider on October 5, 
2005.   
6 Nietzsche uses the French word ressentiment which 
is resentment in English.  
7 GOM, I 13. 
8 GOM, II 7.   
9 BGE 201. 
10 Both the Japanese and Danish experiences are from 
my own experience living in those countries (Japan for 3 
years, Denmark for 2).  I was surprised at how similar 
Japan and Denmark were.  The main similarity is keeping 
the whole at the center versus the individual.  The primary 
difference was that in Japan one did one’s best for the 
group; in Denmark one strived only for average.  The 
Japanese saying was told to me over and over again by 
various people in various situations. 
11 Taken from a conversation with Ellen Mills, De-
cember 7, 2006. 
12 EH “Genealogy of Morals:  A Polemic.” 
13 GOM I 10 
14 Ibid 19. 
15 Ibid 269 
16 Paul Tillich. Theology of Culture (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1959) 133. Noted as TC for the rest 
of the paper. 
17 Ibid 133-134. 
18 Ibid 134. 
19 Paul Tillich.  Morality and Beyond (Louisville:  
Westminster John Knox Press, 1963) 17.  Noted as MB 
for the rest of the paper. 
20 Ibid 17-18 
21 Ibid 19 
22 Ibid 20 
23 Ibid 21 
24 This idea comes from my own reading of various 
Nietzsche works and many hours of contemplation. 
25 Nietzsche, GOM III 27 Nietzsche writes “All great 
things bring about their own destruction through an act of 
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self-overcoming: thus the law of life will have it, the law 
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26 TC 136 
27 MB 28-29 
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30 GOM III 27 
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sources: Chaos and Dance: The Thought of Friedrich 
Nietzsche Class notes, 10/31/06.   
32 GOM II 20.   
33 Ibid. II 1. 
34 Ibid. II 5.   
35 Ibid II 13.  
36 Ibid II 16. 
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39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 142 
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received the free gift God gives of being justified by faith 
in Christ and the Christian ethic is to live in this world 
with faith active in love.  This is key for Luther that faith 
is not a work because that leads to works righteousness, 
but that the love is the fruit of faith lived out for one’s 
neighbor.  This is his basic premise in “Freedom of a 
Christian” in Luther’s Works Volume 31 eds. Jaroslav 
Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1957) 327-377. 
42 Tillich, On the Boundary (New York: Scribner’s, 
1966) 74-75. 
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45 Ibid  
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49 Ibid 88 
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61 Ibid 
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Absolute Faith and the “God above 
God”: Tillich’s New  
Interpretation of God 
 
Christian Danz 
 
Tillich’s manuscript, The Courage to Be, which 
he published in 1952, is not only one of the most 
beautiful writings of Tillich, but also one of the most 
influential. Tillich’s thought has taken effect widely 
beyond the fields of theology with his insistent de-
scription of the courage to be and therewith he has 
summarized very concisely his whole theological 
thinking. It can be seen that the themes of faith and 
doubt appear not only in his late work, but also al-
ready in his early writings.1 When reading The 
Courage to Be, we should also follow up the devel-
opment of Tillich’s writings. Regardless of the effect 
of this work, it is not easy to understand. The reason 
for it lies in Tillich’s use of concepts like courage, 
absolute faith, or the “God above God,” which are 
very suggestive—and they complicate a theoretical 
reconstruction of reasoning. Tillich shifts phenome-
nological notices and structural reflections into each 
other. That has an effect on the understanding of his 
statements. Now the question arises: what is, for Til-
lich, the “God above God,” which corresponds to 
absolute faith? What does Tillich understand under 
absolute faith? In the following, I want to explain 
some notices for a better understanding of Tillich’s 
thoughts. Therefore, it is necessary to include the 
historical development of his theology and philoso-
phy of religion. We have already said: we can find 
the formula of “God above God” not only in Til-
lich’s late, but already in his early writings. We lo-
cate it for the first time in his habilitation, Der Be-
griff des Übernatürlichen, sein dialektischer 
Charakter und das Prinzip der Identität – dargestellt 
an der supranaturalistischen Theologie vor 
Schleiermacher. Tillich writes the following in con-
nection to his criticism of supernatural theology: 
“Der Inbegriff aller Realität und Vollkommenheit 
müßte sowohl über Gott wie über den anderen We-
sen stehen: Ist das Naturgesetz der Gott unter Gott, 
so das Absolute der Gott über Gott. Das Supra führt 
einerseits zu weit, anderseits nicht weit genug über 
die Welt hinaus.”2 
We are going to show that the formulas of 
“faith” and the “God above God” really are key-
words in Tillich’s whole theology. In his concept of 
God above God, the originality of his theology ex-
presses itself in a paradigmatic way. I want to ex-
plain now in two sections Tillich’s new understand-
ing of the concept of God. Initially I want to com-
ment on the formula “God above God” in its devel-
opment in Tillich’s statements after the First World 
War and thus on the context, in which the formula 
for the first time ever appears. In a second section, 
and on the background of the observations of the 
development, I want to analyse Tillich’s absolute 
faith and his understanding of the God above God in 
his writing of 1952. My thesis is that the formula 
God above God represents a reflexive description of 
the self-understanding of a person in the act of faith. 
It describes with other words the dialectic of the 
faith itself and is an expression of the act of faith. 
 
Certainty and Doubt, or the Dialectic of the True 
 Faith 
 
As already mentioned, we can find Tillich’s 
formula of God above God in his habilitation from 
Halle in 1915 for the first time. Here it is associated 
with Tillich’s criticism of the supernatural theology 
before Schleiermacher. Tillich’s considerations for 
reasoning a modern theology how he himself articu-
lates in his letter to Emanuel Hirsch of February 20, 
1918, are the immediate context of this writing.3 
During the First World War, Tillich had modified 
the theoretical foundations and principles of his 
theology. However, the concept of meaning takes 
the place now of the concept of absolute truth that 
has been the basic principle, for instance, in his 
Systematische Theologie of 1913. Tillich’s formula 
of God above God, seen in the development, belongs 
to the context of this conversion of his pre-War 
theology. That becomes apparent already in the first 
references to his new foundation of modern 
theology. December 5, 1917, Tillich wrote to Maria 
Klein: “Through intensive analysis of the subject of 
justification, I arrived long ago at the paradox of 
‘faith without God,’ and further determination and 
unfolding of this concept shapes the content of my 
current religious and philosophical thought.”4 In this 
quotation, Tillich does not speak about the God 
above God, but on the paradox of a faith without 
God. This paradox includes Tillich in his thought of 
God above God. For a better understanding of 
Tillich’s speech on the God above God we should 
have a more detailed look at his early theology.  
Let us begin with Tillich’s early draft Rechtfer-
tigung und Zweifel of 1919, which is—after the ha-
bilitation—his second important early writing, in 
which he speaks on God above God. Also, in Recht-
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fertigung und Zweifel, it is a matter of a foundational 
theological principle, which at the same time could 
serve as a principle of a theology of culture. What 
does Tillich then mean with his speech on the God 
above God? Now it is not possible to analyse Til-
lich’s argument in detail, but let us turn to the key 
point of his remarks. These lie in faith as the af-
firmation of the absolute paradox. This understand-
ing of faith becomes more clear if we look a little bit 
closer at Tillich’s understanding of the human self. 
What does the young Tillich understand by the hu-
man self? The human self is characterized by three 
aspects: (1) It is a dynamic dimension, which in the 
first place arises out of the act of self-determination. 
The self has its “being” by positing itself (sich selbst 
setzen). Therein underlies its liberty. (2) The self is 
characterized by an inner antinomy, which includes 
that the self is unconditioned as well as conditioned 
at the same time. Because of its absoluteness it is 
affirming itself, but it is able to affirm itself only as 
conditioned and determined. Tillich calls this the ur-
paradox of the spirit.5 So we can conclude, because 
of its antinomy, the self never understands itself as 
itself, but only as conditioned and determined. (3) In 
order that is connected, an endless process of posit-
ing and negation, which Tillich understands as sub-
jectivity or negativity, takes place. By the antinomy 
of the self, the conditioned form, in which the self is 
realizing itself, can never be identical with the self in 
its absoluteness. Therefore, the self has to negate the 
concrete forms. This happens by substituting other 
forms. In his early draft of Rechtfertigung und 
Zweifel, Tillich determined the just drafted structure 
of the self as doubt or negativity, which is constitu-
tive for the self. In Tillich’s own words the doubt is 
“der religiös-konkrete Ausdruck für die Subjektiv-
ität, die in das religiöse Princip aufzunehmen ist. Der 
Akt, in dem das Subjekt sich von der substantiellen 
Einheit mit dem Objekt löst, in dem es sich selbst als 
unterschieden von dem Objekt und in seiner Freiheit 
ihm gegenüber erlebt, stellt es zugleich vor die 
Möglichkeit des Andersseins, der Zwei- und 
Mehrheit des Zweifels. Im Zweifel,” so Tillich 
weiter, “ist die Subjektivität rein aktualisiert, sie hat 
das Objekt verloren und noch kein neues gefunden; 
sie ist ganz in sich selbst.”6 
Tillich’s understanding of faith as an affirmation 
of the absolute paradox is based on this structure of 
the self. Faith is for Tillich nothing else than the 
self-understanding of the self in its inner antinomy. 
We have already heard that calls Tillich the absolute 
paradox that exists in the contingent self-
understanding of the self in its own structure. By 
affirmation in its own negativity, the self comes to 
itself and to its truth. Doubt is for Tillich the wise 
realization of unconditioned certainty. “Es bleibt nur 
der paradoxe Ausweg, im Glauben zu bejahen, daß 
der Zweifel das Stehen in der Wahrheit nicht auf-
hebt.”7 It follows that faith, as an affirmation of the 
absolute paradox, is the happening, in which the self 
becomes itself understood in its inner structure. That 
means further: doubt is the way of realization of the 
self itself.  
Let’s have a look at the concept of God now. 
Tillich understands the concept of God as a moment 
in the structure of subjectivity and a self-description 
of faith as happening of the self-understanding of the 
self in its inner structure. For this, only reason repre-
sents the concept of God the dialectic, which is the 
faith itself, with Tillich’s own words: “Die Dialektik 
des Zweifels treibt also zu einem Gott über Gott, zu 
einem Gott des Zweiflers, ja des Atheisten.”8 The 
answer to the question of how we, how can Tillich 
speak about God above God, we find in this: God 
above God is nothing else than the self-description 
of faith and in that the self-understanding of the self 
in its inner structure of antinomy. 
 
Absolute Faith 
 
By looking from the early work, Rechtfertigung 
und Zweifel, to Tillich’s late writing, The Courage to 
Be, at first we notice a change terminology. Now 
Tillich not only uses ontological language, but fur-
thermore his basic understanding of faith as an af-
firmation of his early writing does not e exist in his 
later text. Nevertheless The Courage to Be may ap-
ply as a late comment to his early draft Rechtferti-
gung und Zweifel. The basic subject remains the dia-
lectic of certainty and doubt, and Tillich still be-
lieves that sickness unto death, speaking with 
Kierkegaard, could only be cured by courage to be 
that does not exclude doubt. “Which courage is able 
to take non-being into itself in the form of doubt and 
meaninglessness?”9 So Tillich formulates the central 
question. Instead of faith as affirmation of the abso-
lute paradox, Tillich speaks now about absolute faith 
and relates this absolute faith to the God above 
God—like in his early draft. Now we have to reply 
to the question of how Tillich understands absolute 
faith and the God above God? In The Courage to Be, 
Tillich understands the self as a dynamic dimension. 
The human is only thus human by positing himself 
and knowing about this act of positing himself. “On-
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tic and spiritual self-affirmation must be distin-
guished but they cannot be separated. Man’s being 
includes his relation to meanings. He is human only 
by understanding and shaping reality, both his world 
and himself, according to meaning and values. His 
being is spiritual even in the most primitive expres-
sions of the most primitive human being.”10 Seen in 
this context Tillich understands the human self as 
self-determining and as an intellectual being the hu-
man has certain knowledge about himself. However, 
the human self is positing itself only as concrete and 
determined. And as self in its self-relatedness, it is 
never identical with its own positing. From it results 
the drama of the self-determined human being, that 
both describes in a similar insistent wise: Tillich in 
his The Courage to Be and likewise Kierkegaard in 
his The Sickness unto Death. Although Tillich refers 
to Kierkegaard only in few places of his writing, we 
cannot ignore that Tillich’s determination of faith as 
he courage to be rests on Kierkegaard’s understand-
ing of sins. Let us now consider more, what does 
Tillich in his The Courage to Be understand under 
absolute faith? In one of the central places in the 
chapter 6, “Courage and Transcendence,” he writes 
the following: “Faith is the state of being grasped by 
the power of being-itself. The courage to be is an 
expression of faith and what ‘faith’ means must be 
understood through the courage to be. We have de-
fined courage as the self-affirmation of being in 
spite of non-being.”11 Faith, so we can say with Til-
lich’s description, is the courage of the self in ac-
cepting itself despite of the always current threat of 
the non-being. We see in this determination of faith 
that Tillich has included his former understanding of 
faith as affirmation of the absolute paradox in The 
Courage to Be and has it translated in his abstract 
concept of his late work. In addition, faith is under-
stood as happening in the self-understanding of the 
self in the constitutive negation of itself. Tillich re-
lates the act of the self-understanding in its relation 
of antinomy to itself to absolute faith. Regardless of 
its absoluteness, faith is self-realizing only by condi-
tioned forms. The self becomes aware of these 
forms, in which it is positing itself in the act of faith 
and realizes them as together needful and conflicting 
mediums of its self-understanding. This is the reason 
that absolute faith, as the act of becoming self-
understood in self-relatedness, is always referred to 
concrete contents, but so, that it does not have spe-
cial contents. This absolute faith becomes self-aware 
“of a faith which has been deprived by doubt of any 
concrete content, which nevertheless is faith and the 
source of the most paradoxical manifestation of the 
courage to be.”12 
In the last chapter of The Courage to Be, Tillich 
explains his thought on the God above God in a 
critical argument with theism. This God above God 
should be an alternative to the theistic concept of 
God, from which Tillich differs in three ways. Let us 
now ask for the keyword, the main thought in The 
Courage to Be. The God above God could only then 
be an alternative to the theistic concept of God, if it 
is a part of the structure of subjectivity. Also, Til-
lich’s determination of being-itself does not aim at 
an ontological dimension, which anywise exists in-
dependent of subjective realizations. In this case, 
namely it is not to be accepted why and in what way 
the God above God should be an alternative to the 
theistic concept of God. But, how could we then un-
derstand the God above God whom we cannot de-
scribe like “the God of all forms of theism”?13 
According to Tillich’s advice, that the courage 
to be “in its radical form is a key to the idea of God 
which transcends both mysticism and the person-to-
person encounter,”14 then God above God can only 
be understood as a self-description of faith. In the 
concept of God, faith not only represents and de-
scribes itself, but it understands itself. Tillich’s 
words of the God above God have a functional 
status, because in them it enlightens faith itself. An 
expression of the self-understanding of the self in its 
positing and in its negation of concrete forms, the 
concept of God in fact is only then, if this dialectic 
has a place in the concept of God. Since the First 
World War, Tillich has taken up the tension between 
ground and abyss into his concept of God. As self-
description of the act of faith, the concept of God 
begins in the first place together with faith. Other-
wise it would not be an expression of faith and also 
no alternative to the theism. 
Summarizing briefly our considerations on Til-
lich’s early draft of Rechtfertigung und Zweifel we 
can observe, that the development of Tillich’s theol-
ogy has a high degree of continuity. 
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